Can we finish the discussion surrounding the ‘toovercirkel’?
Play, in its most simplest forms like in animal life, is usually seen as more than just an element of nature which a biological immaterial efficiency is connected to. Huizinga states that many statements could be given to play that all stand next to each other, without conceptually conflicting. He calls play an acknowledgment of the mind and a basis and factor for culture.[1] Within the esthetical, play is drenched with rhythm and harmony; the “noblest gifts of the esthetical ability of perception gifted to the human.”[2] Besides, play is free, because we could also leave it alone. Play, thus, is separated from ‘normal’ life, as excursion into a temporal sphere of place and duration. An activity which occupies our entire being, as a break of daily life.[3] Subsequently, every game could be stored as a memory, and on every wished full moment, endlessly be recalled and repeated.
Every game moves within its space of play, which, either material or imaginary, deliberately or naturally, has been defined in advance. (…) [T]he tovercikel, (…) [is], to form and function, [a] space of play, that is, forbidden ground, secluded, fenced, hallowed grounds, within which its own rules apply.[4]
The toovercirkel, thus, could be described as the experience of play as a separated space, with its own rules, detached from the normal world.
Many academics have a problem with the toovercirkel as the separated space of experience, as it implicates that games do not have any influence without this circle. Play, however, takes time, influences our mood and behavior, communicates and sometimes even involves real money, for example with gambling games.[5] A lot of discussion surrounds the definition of play and how the toovercirkel is intended. For this reason, I want to research the different eminent definitions of play regarding the toovercirkel and place them next to each other. My question, thus, would be if the term ‘toovercirkel’ can be replaced by another term in the identification of ‘play’? With the help of Wittgenstein’s motion about family resemblance I want to view if multiple definitions of the ‘seperated space of play’ can coexist and what the common characteristics are of ‘play’. It may then be possible to find a stable definition. Besides, Davidson’s theory about conceptual paradigms could add an interesting perspective.
Despite the toovercirkel being widely accepted and convenient in indicating the difference between play and non-play, functioning as a border between the activity ‘playing’, the term is a hotly debated subject in the science of play.[6] Several scholars took different turns, like Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman in 2005. They used the term to indicate when a play starts and ends and they state that the toovercirkel is voluntarily approached, self-sufficient, separated from normal life in place and time and has its own rules. The idea of a special place in time and space created through a game.[7]
According to Wittgenstein, man longs to generalizations. We tend to look for agreements between units that we put under the same term. Coincidentally he uses the example of ‘games’ forming a family together, whose relatives have similarities. Wittgenstein states that units under the same term have something in common, but are all related to each other in a different way. Family resemblance is a theory which compares this relationship with the relations that family members possess and ‘explains’ why a general term could be applies to a set of units.[8]
The family resemblance between Salen and Zimmerman’s theory and the one of Huizinga, are, thus, that play is voluntary and contains its own time an place within the space with its own rules. The problem, however, arises that you can’t state that x and y contain a family resemblance without firstly defining a family… But how do you define a family without the terms of family resemblance? According to the theory, games are games because they contain similarities, but how could you avoid that some similarities are more urgent than others? And how do you prevent terms becoming synonyms of each other when the requirements of a commonly shared term are only a few similarities? [9]
A possible solution is setting the condition that term p could be applied when the similarities a, b, c and d are applicable. But what happens when b, c, d, and e are applicable? Would you say that it is a game, just because it is? Wittgenstein would say so.[10] It could be said, as a solution, that it doesn’t have to contain a, b, c and d, but or a, or b, or c, or d. Huizinga, thus, states, that the term play could be applied when it is voluntary, contains a toovercirkel (its own place and time in space) and its own rules, a culture emerges from it and contains rituality. Salen and Zimmerman state, however, that culture doesn’t necessarily has to follow from play and that the holiness of rituals also don’t necessarily have to be a requirement. So they drop d and e and apply the ‘or’-rule. Justified criticism is, that in this way, however, infinite distinctions could be made.[11]
We would, however, still be left with the criticism of play being understood as separated of normal life, safe, entertaining and without any consequences. From the discussion surrounding this criticism, two alternatives for the toovercirkel have emerged. Jesper Juul states that the toovercirkel seems too isolated and suggests another metaphor; a piece of a puzzle. A piece of a puzzle is, namely, not a secluded circle, but interacts with the world around it. It fits different situations of play as each side differs. Edward Castronova, on the other hand, sees the toovercirkel as a membrane which allows a flexible transition of play to non-play.[12] This means that players do not enter another world, but actively and fast switch between roles. Take for example the situation of you playing a game, and then suddenly taking on a package from the delivery man, which results in you changing from a playful attitude to the serious action of signing for reception.[13]
To avoid the paradox of family resemblance, the definitions could be viewed as conceptual schemes. This is a way to organize within systems of categories; or so to say, to give form to data or sensation.[14] The idea exists that a conceptual scheme could be equated to language, where different levels could share the same scheme. This creates set of translatable languages. Davidson wonders then if untranslatable languages contain a different conceptual scheme?[15] He notes, however, that man could talk from one paradigm over the other which creates a necessity for translation. Besides that, only one reality exists, as a result of which translating should be possible as long as you hold onto the world.[16] Davidson, thus, states that conceptual relativism is not possible.[17] And so, play shouldn’t be seen as another paradigm on the world, but as a part of the world. Like Huizinga states, play is, with “a regularly recurring variation, (…) a guidance, complement, a part of life in general.”[18]
The question, then, would be if all three terms, membrane, piece of the puzzle and toovercirkel, could function as a different paradigm on play, when play is considered a part of the world with one reality. Play would then have just one true definition, fitting all possible forms of play. Besides, it isn’t possible that the three terms work as a synonym of each other, since the intended objective of the alternative terms, membrane and piece of a puzzle, should solve the problem of a toovercirkel and shouldn’t mean the same. Besides, membrane and piece of a puzzle have a objective worldly meaning, while the term ‘toovercirkel’ only exists within the context of play. The three terms, thus, contain different family resemblances.
The solution for the problem of a ‘isolated space of play’ then could be the principle of charity. This mean that we, to understand others and promote communication, should apply charity. We have to push our own definition of terms, partly, aside, so we could reach a compromise with the other about how a term should be used in conversation.[19] This way, it can be determined per game if it contains the context of a toovercirkel, a piece of a puzzle or membrane. This way, however, an objective truth of understanding cannot be found. Something which with science is actively pursuing.[20] We could, thus, conclude that the toovercirkel definitely has its flaws concerning the secretion it proposes, but also that the alternatives do not include the completeness held by the term toovercirkel in the context of play.
Often times, the context is a key point in in the deepened understanding of the different forms of play. Most scholars agree that a border exists between play and non-play.[21] The question mainly is what this border looks like. Perhaps that is just the reason why Huizinga labels it as magical, as people can’t seem to agree on what this invisible border looks like, is being constructed and merely exists within the temporary sphere of the playful flow of thought. That is; when you are physically and mindfully fully involved within the activity of doing,[22] eventually covering the physical real surroundings and attaining immersion during play.[23] I suggest we do not see the toovercirkel as an interpretation of the ‘secluded space of play’ for the benefit of defining play, but as a powerful metaphor for the immersive playful attitude that we temporarily take on.[24]
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[1] Johan Huizinga en Vincent Mentzel, Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 13, 14, 16, 17.
[2] Huizinga, Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur, 19.
[3] Huizinga, Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur, 20, 21, 26.
[4] Huizinga, Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur, 26.
[5] Simon Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Jonas Heide Smith en Susana Tosca, “3. What Is a Game?” in Understanding Video Games: The Essential Introduction (Londen: Routledge, 2015), 46.
[6] Jaakko Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” in Transactions of the Digital Games Research Association vol. 1, no. 2 (2014), 147. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26503/todigra.v1i2.10
[7] Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 149, 150; Christopher Moore, “The magic circle and the mobility of play,” in Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies vol 17, no. 4 (November 2011), 375. DOI:
https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1177%2F1354856511414350.
[8] L. Pompa, “Family resemblance,” in The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 16, no. 66 (januari 1967), 63, 65.
[9] Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 150; Pompa, “Family resemblance,” 63, 65, 66.
[10] Pompa, “Family resemblance,” 67.
[11] Pompa, “Family resemblance,” 68; Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 150.
[12] Moore, “The magic circle and the mobility of play,” 379; Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 152.
[13] Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 152, 153.
[14] Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association vol. 47 (1973-74), 5.
[15] Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 7.
[16] Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 11, 12.
[17] Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 20.
[18] Huizinga, Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur, 21.
[19] Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 18, 19.
[20] Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 20.
[21] Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 152, 153.
[22] Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention,” in HarperPerennial New York 39 (1997), 8. http://vedpuriswar.org/Book_Review/Leadership_Managerial_Effectiveness/Creativity.pdf
[23] Isabella van Elferen, “¡Un Forastero! Issues of Virtuality and Diegesis in Videogame Music,” in Music
and the Moving Image 4, no. 2 (Zomer 2011), 30-33.
[24] Stenros, “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play,” 154.
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Used Literature
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. “Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention.” HarperPerennial New York 39 (1997): 1-16. http://vedpuriswar.org/Book_Review/Leadership_Managerial_Effectiveness/Creativity.pdf
Davidson, Donald. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association vol. 47. 1973-74. 5-20.
Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Simon, Jonas Heide Smith en Susana Tosca. “3. What Is a Game?” InUnderstanding Video Games: The Essential Introduction. Londen: Routledge, 2015.
Huizinga, Johan en Vincent Mentzel. Homo Ludens : Proeve Eener Bepaling van Het Spel-Element Der Cultuur. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.
Moore, Christopher. “The magic circle and the mobility of play.” In Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies vol 17, no. 4. November 2011. 373-387. DOI: https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1177%2F1354856511414350.
Pompa, L. “Family resemblance.” In The Philosophical Quarterly vol. 16, no. 66. januari 1967. 63-69.
Stenros, Jaakko. , “In Defence of a Magic Circle: The Social, Mental and Cultural Boundaries of Play.” In Transactions of the Digital Games Research Association vol. 1, no. 2. 2014. 147-185. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26503/todigra.v1i2.10
Van Elferen, Isabella. “¡Un Forastero! Issues of Virtuality and Diegesis in Videogame Music.” Music and the Moving Image 4, no. 2 (zomer 2011): 30-39.